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The Perfect Storm: Catastrophic Collapse in the 21st Century
Glen Kuecker, DePauw University, Indiana, USA
Abstract: This paper utilizes complex systems theory to argue that we are currently living in catastrophic collapse of the
global system. It focuses on topics like climate chance, ecological destruction, pandemics, fuel shortages, warfate, and
global hunger to illustrate the interconnections between multiple points of failure within the global system. The argument
maintains that sustainability perspectives miss the fundamental reality of the global crisis.
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F

ORMER VICE PRESIDENT Al Gore’s
documentary Inconvenient Truth has
awakened people to the twin problems of
global warming and climate change. An April
2007 poll shows that even 60 percent of Republicans
now think these issues are serious (Time, 28 May
2007). As follow-up to the documentary, a group
known as the “Focus the Nation” has organized discussions about Gore’s dire warnings and possible
solutions. Planners envision an energized civil society participating in grassroots forums at their
churches, grade schools, offices, and universities. In
April 2007 they held a national conference in Las
Vegas, where people convened to share results of
their meetings and plan the next step in saving the
planet. Gore has stimulated a remarkable mobilization, one that has the potential to reach millions of
people in consideration of what many think to be the
most important issue of the 21st Century (http://www.focusthenation.org/). It may influence the
United States government to take more aggressive
measures in combating global warming, especially
because other grassroots campaigns, like Bill McKibben’s “Step It UP” (stepitup07.org and McKibben,
2007b) are underway. If we depart from hydrocarbon
civilization, the mobilization will have resulted in a
revolutionary shift in economy and society comparable to the industrial revolution. The paradigm shift
called for by Gore’s followers would be one of the
greatest in history, similar to the abolition movement.
The current global warming movement, however,
has several critical flaws, which may cripple its
mission. Foremost, it is a single-issue approach, one
that neglects substantive consideration of the interconnections between climate change and several
other major crises. Failure to see climate change as
part of a larger systemic crisis results in misguided
public policy, and a naive confidence in the ease of
paradigm shift. The core of the flaw is the emphasis
on sustainability, which falsely sees collapse not as

a current reality but a future event. To avoid collapse
the sustainability view takes a reformist position;
with just enough timely tinkering the system can go
on forever without any radical change. To use the
coal miner’s canary metaphor, this view sees the canary as alive, although gasping for air and needing
better circumstances. Instead, we need to understand
that the canary is dead, and we need to evacuate the
coal mine. The time for making sustainability happen
has long passed, and its belated pursuit will prevent
us from addressing the present reality of catastrophic
collapse.
Hurricane Katrina may help people in the United
States to see catastrophic events as immediate and
long lasting challenges to humanity. Katrina woke
people up to how inadequately prepared local, state,
and federal governments are in the face of large-scale
catastrophe, how sophisticated public policy
crumbles in application, and how scarce public resources drained by colonial projects undermine vital
infrastructure required for sustaining modernity’s
complex systems. Hurricane Katrina also teaches
how pre-existing race and class inequalities shape
catastrophic outcomes by defining who is evacuated,
rescued, and attended. It also re-mapped the public’s
geography of catastrophe by bringing an event associated with the global South to the global North
(Walter, 2006a). Some wisely question the state of
preparation for other inevitable catastrophes
(Brinkley, 2006; Copper and Block, 2006; Horne,
2006; and Dyson, 2005). Despite such advances there
exists a delusional quality to our thinking, as if we
are unwilling to stare directly at the obvious reality
that our modern life is structurally flawed on multiple
fronts that have converged in starting the preliminary
phases of catastrophic systemic collapse.
Even among those who approach global crises
from a system perspective, there is an overwhelming
propensity to construct a master narrative of optimism. It maintains that while the system is in deep
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crisis we still have the opportunity to escape if only
we act now. David Korten, clearly illustrates his
conviction that the global system is not on a sustainable course, the “Siren Songs” have been played,
and we are not listening to the warning because of
delusion, ignorance and/or benign neglect (Korten,
1999 and 2001). Jared Diamond states:
The risk of such collapses today is now a matter
of increasing concern…. Many people fear that
ecocide has now come to overshadow nuclear
war and emerging diseases as a threat to global
civilization…. Most of these threats…. it is
claimed, will become globally critical within
the next few decades: either we solve the problems by then, or the problems will undermine
not just Somalia but also First World societies.
Much more likely than a doomsday scenario
involving human extinction or an apocalyptic
collapse of industrial civilization would be ‘just’
a future of significantly lower living standards,
chronically higher risks, and the undermining
of what we now consider some of our key values (2005: 7).
He adds, “for the first time in history, we face the
risk of a global decline” (2005: 23). The authors of
Limits to Growth clearly argue that the world is in
“overshoot,” and we are set on an unsustainable
course. Their multiple models demonstrate a short
time period, within 50 years, before systemic collapse
will replace overshoot. They state:
The global challenge can simply be stated: To
reach sustainability, humanity must increase
the consumption levels of the world’s poor,
while at the same time reducing humanity’s
total ecological footprint. There must be technological advance, and personal change, and
longer planning horizons. There must be greater
respect, caring, and sharing across political
boundaries. This will take decades to achieve
even under the best circumstances. No modern
political party had garnered broad support for
such a program, certainly not among the rich
and powerful, who could make room for growth
among the poor by reducing their own footprints. Meanwhile, the global footprint gets
larger day by day” (Meadows, Randers, Meadows, 2004: XV).
The 2006 edition of State of the World explains,
“Unless we find a couple of spare planets in the next
few decades…. it is clear that the current western
development model is not sustainable. We therefore
face a choice: rethink almost everything, or risk a
downward spiral of political competition and economic collapse” (Flavin, 2006: xxi-xxii). Thomas Homer-

Dixon also clearly demonstrates the likeliness of
systemic collapse, but his Ingenuity Gap maintains
an optimistic line of analysis (2000). In a subsequent
book Homer-Dixon finds collapse to be almost certain, so much so he invites us to prepare for it by
considering how catastrophe allows for the total regeneration of civilization (2006). These master narratives each have a firm conviction that the coal
miner’s canary is very much alive, and inhibit us
from considering the canary’s actual death.
Clifford Geertz suggests the reasons for why we
deny the canary’s death. He states:
The main problem, over and above their mindbending dimensions, is that these various sorts
of mega catastrophes seem to most people either
so far off, so unlikely, or so thoroughly beyond
what they have even vicariously experienced—psychologically off-scale, conceptually
out-of-sight – as to be beyond the range of rational estimation or practical response. We are
both emotionally disinclined and intellectually
ill equipped to think systematically about extreme events. Absorbed as we are in the dailiness of ordinary life, and enfolded by its brevity, the calculation of remote possibilities and
the comparison of transcendent cataclysms look
pointless; comic, even (2005: 5).
Denial invites us to frame catastrophes as unique,
disconnected, and particular events. We see unexpected tragedy as the only common ground between
September 11th, the Tsunami, or Hurricane Katrina.
Wrongly framed, our picture of what catastrophes
are results in bad public policy that make disasters
so much worse when they happen. The consequences
are immense, as each catastrophic event carries a
bigger punch, and our ability to survive is further
compromised (Diamond, 2005; Geertz, 2005; HomerDixon, 2006: 29-30).
To correct this problem we need to see catastrophic events as part of a larger process, as multiple
points of structural crisis converging to form the
“Perfect Storm” of the global system’s catastrophic
collapse. We need to understand catastrophic collapse
is currently in process, and it is not something
looming in the distant future. We need to understand
that avoiding the collapse by altering course is not
possible, because the time for changing course has
long passed. Catastrophic collapse means that framing current reality with analysis defined by sustainability misunderstands reality. Sustainability analysis
remains within an old paradigm defined by a conviction that applied reason can solve the problems that
may cause collapse. It is premised upon the Enlightenment’s project of perfecting the human condition.
The catastrophic collapse paradigm takes a post-Enlightenment position. In collapse the perfectibility
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of the human condition yields to the basics of survival. Of course, surviving collapse will require implementing sustainability and wise application of the
Enlightenment’s paradigm of science and technology.
To appreciate this argument an explanation of
complex systems is needed. Systems theory, while
complex in application, has basic propositions. A
system is constituted from multiple sub-systems,
which in turn are the product of many interacting
parts. Systems, especially as they evolve and become
more complex in their structure and functioning,
have three paths they can follow. They can reproduce, becoming ever more complex with each successive reproduction. Conversely, their interactions
can set-off a catastrophic structural flaw that causes
the interacting parts and sub-systems to destroy the
system. In this case, the system stops functioning
and enters a state of collapse. Between these two
paths, rests the third possibility, oscillation. It occurs
when systems wobble between the states of reproduction and collapse. It is an unstable state, sometimes
called the “edge of chaos,” in which a system can
have periods of reproduction before yielding to
periods of crisis (Clark, 2002; Perrow, 1984;
Waldrop, 1992; and Homer-Dixon, 2000 and 2006).
Meadows, Randers, and Meadows argue we are
currently experiencing either oscillation or collapse
because the system is in a state of overshoot, in
which it has surpassed capacity for reproduction
(2004).
Complex systems, especially those that have humans as key components, have remarkable survival
mechanisms focused around the capacity to adapt to
the unpredictable ways a system can evolve. An adaptive system finds solutions to potentially catastrophic interactions within the system. These solutions are
technological fixes, and they are a driving force in
systemic reproduction. Such adaptation, however,
has important limitations. Often solutions only treat
the symptom of the original problem, making the
evolving system inherently unstable. The system
eventually becomes so complex that it is not possible
to predict possible outcomes of systemic interactions
(Perrow, 1984). Unpredictability can throw a healthy
system into oscillation, and an oscillating system
into collapse. Likewise, and more dangerous, adaptation produces new and more complicated interactions in the system –what Homer-Dixon calls “unknown unknowns.” They inevitably produce a catastrophic interaction for which innovative technology
cannot fix (2000: 171-187).
The current global system -- the totality of systems, subsystems, and interacting parts – is producing
a phenomenal level of “unknown unknowns.” It is
built upon centuries of technological innovations
that create stopgap, band-aide solutions to underlying
structural problems. We often are unable to anticipate

the next systemic crisis, while we continue to compound the problem by adding temporary and misguided solutions. Our ignorance about complexity
and unwillingness to take what we do know seriously
means catastrophic events increasingly define the
human condition. We continue to select public
policies that are disastrous in their consequences,
and we frequently mask them with professional, authoritative, or expert sounding language. The implications for wrong thinking are immense.
We confront multiple points of structural crisis
within the global system. Even in isolation, anyone
of these points could trigger a tipping point in the
system, pushing it away from oscillation and into
collapse. Each is capable of driving collapse deeper
and faster, overwhelming our capacity to cope. A
short-list of the ongoing structural crises includes:
energy, environment, climate, disease, population,
economics, and conflict. As the current global system
is tightly coupled with a historically unprecedented
degree of intensity, we need to recognize that each
of the points of crisis is related to the others (HomerDixon, 2000: 112). Tight coupling can generate
positive feedback loops within the system, causing
a convergence of structural crises resulting in the
“perfect Storm.” Our current historical moment is
defined by the initial phases of the storm.
With the price of gasoline floating at $3 a gallon,
people in the United States are slowly waking-up
from their SUV slumber to discover oil is not a renewable resource. They are also learning that the
historical moment when oil is no longer available is
rapidly approaching. In fact, most oil companies,
economists, and academics agree that peak oil production is within the next twenty years, possibly ten.
When Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disrupted the flow
of petroleum into and out of the southern refinery
sector, US citizens became keenly aware of our dependence on petroleum as well as the extreme vulnerability of the petroleum infrastructure, the system
of production and delivery needed for our energy
system to survive. As Daniel Yergin explains, a
structural crisis in any part of the infrastructure can
cause significant ripples or waves through the entire
system – what is called a positive feedback loop-potentially causing regional, national, or global economic crisis (Yergin, 1991). As our pocket books
suffer, awareness increases. But, this awareness is
profoundly misguided about the problem.
As people pay more at the gas pump, they are
seldom aware that peak oil production has profound
consequences for the meaning of life on earth. Our
civilization, as Yergin illustrates, is defined by hydrocarbons (1991: 541-560). They are omnipresent.
Petroleum is not only essential for powering transportation systems, but also provides petrochemicals
needed for synthetics in manufacturing, those plastics
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that are in just about everything we consume
(Kunstler, 2005: 23). The end of oil means we need
to substitute petroleum with something new if we
are to sustain the current levels and forms of production (Roberts, 2005: 1-17). Furthermore, Hydrocarbons are the key component in manufacturing the
fertilizers that drove the Green Revolution’s 250
percent increase in grain production and sustains the
current system of intensive agriculture that nearly
seven billion people depend upon (Kunstler, 2005:
159-160). While we already experience the preliminary phases of collapse within the fuel sector, peak
oil production means we will soon have structural
crisis in industrial production and food sectors of the
global system.
Transitioning from petroleum to an alternative
energy, food, and production source is an extreme
challenge. We know that future oil consumption,
especially with the needs of huge consumers like
China and India, will continue to rapidly increase.
Current demand is nearly 2 million barrels per day,
and has an annual rate of increase at 2.25 percent
(McKibben, 2004: 34). Global energy consumption
will rise by 71 percent between 2003 and 2030
(Runge and Senauer, 2007: 44). This increased demand is hitting concurrently with the era of peak
production, consequently decline in available oil will
be rapid not gradual. Rapid depletion will cause
major shocks within the system and make gradual
and smooth transition exceptionally difficult to accomplish, especially on a coordinated and cooperative global level. Second, we know that finding alternatives to hydrocarbons is an exceptionally difficult
if not impossible proposition.
Those seeking hydrocarbon substitutes focus
mainly on energy. There is little discussion about
how to supplant petrochemicals that underpin food
and manufacturing systems. But even in the area of
energy, the prospects are not good. Jeremy Rifkin
illustrates that fuel substitutes range from solar, wind,
hydro, and nuclear power, but they are not practical
replacements. Many have invested great faith in the
natural gas “bridge” to carry us over to hydrogen.
Our future depends on making that bridge function
while transitioning to a new fuel source. If we make
it, hydrogen is a safe, renewable, clean, and longterm solution. But, getting to hydrogen is a dubious
proposition, because the technology needed is closer
to science fiction than application, costs are immense,
and public policy is decades late in pushing the
change. Oil interests also prevent rapid change, as
they are committed to the dead energy system until
the market tips in favor of hydrogen. The market’s
lag time is too long, and, most likely, we have passed
the point of seamless transition to hydrogen. With a
$600 billion price tag for its infrastructure just in the

United States, the costs of a global hydrogen transition may be prohibitive (Rifkin, 2003).
Many people think biofuel provides a good hydrocarbon substitute. There are, however, several limitations with biofuel. First, producing biofuel still
consumes high levels of energy, which often comes
from coal or natural gas. Second, biofuel requires
converting large tracts of land for sugar, soybeans,
or corn. In many places, tropical forests are being
cleared for biofuel production. With continued consumption of hydrocarbons and forest depletion, biofuel actually has the potential to increase green house
gases (Moberg, 2007: 24-26 and Farrell 2006: 506508). Third, biofuel deepens food insecurity by putting people and cars in direct competition for fuel
(Azar, 2005). For example, “filling the 25-gallon
tank of an SUV with pure ethanol requires 450
pounds of corn—which contains enough calories to
feed one person for a year.” Increasing ethanol production in the United States thus has consequences
in countries like Mexico. Ethanol production has
driven the price of corn from $2 per bushel to $4.35.
This jump resulted in a doubling of Mexico’s corn
tortilla prices during the last months of 2006, which
caused a subsistence crisis for nearly 50 million
Mexicans living in poverty. Runge and Senauer warn,
“resorting to biofuels is likely to exacerbate world
hunger.” They state, “the number of food-insecure
people in the world [may] rise by over 16 million
for every percentage increase in the real prices of
staple foods. That means that 1.2 billion people could
be chronically hungry by 2025” (2007). Biofuel illustrates how the promise of a quick and cheap fix to
the energy problem, one that will allow the current
system to continue without dramatic change, causes
positive feedback loops within the larger system,
resulting in grave, unintended consequences. The
quick fix is part of the fallacy of the sustainability
approach, because it glosses over the problems that
emerge when radical change is avoided by shallow
thinking.
If we navigate the transportation, production, and
food crises, we still have to contend with climatic
consequences of hydrocarbon civilization. Climate
is perhaps the most complex of complex systems. A
multitude of inputs feed the system and cause the
“butterfly effect” of positive feed back loops resulting in potentially catastrophic climate change. Climate change illustrates how complex systems produce “unknown unknowns.” While we do in fact
know global warming is happening, its certain consequences are less known. The 2007 round of reports
from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) makes it blatantly clear that there will be
negative consequences that require immediate and
deep action to mitigate (McKibben, 2007a and IPCC,
2007). Only the most ignorant of fools rejects the
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reality that the Gulf of Mexico’s water temperature
increased because of global warming. Kerry
Emanuel’s research shows that the power and duration of catastrophic storms is directly related to such
temperature increases (2005). The IPCC supports
this scenario by predicting more frequent and severe
storms (2007). Melting of the polar ice caps also influences water temperature. Such change can alter
the flow and temperature of the Gulf Stream, the
engine that drives weather from North America to
Europe. Such change may trigger droughts where
predictable rains are known, and change the geography of climate that influences global economic
systems. Climate change might do what Ché never
could by flipping Eduardo Galeano’s “upside down
world” right side up (Galeano, 2000).
It is possible that the current increase in catastrophic weather events can tip toward conditions unfavorable to life on earth. We simply do not know. The
Pentagon is concerned enough about climate change
that it has ordered studies of worse case scenarios
and how they impact national security. One study
describes how climate change causes the breakdown
of state systems resulting in civil wars, social upheaval, and mass migration. This scenario is beyond the
capacity of the United States to manage (Schwartz
and Randall, 2003). The United Kingdom’s Ministry
of Defence is likewise concerned, listing climate
change as one of three global security threats (Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 2007). We
only need visit post-Katrina New Orleans, a comparatively tiny example of response failure, to appreciate
this concern (Brinkley, 2006 and Horne, 2006).
Climate change directly interacts with the global
ecological system, one that is under immense stress
even without climate change. As with climate
change, the impact of altering ecological systems is
very hard to predict. There are some basic guidelines,
however. We know that life depends upon diversity
for evolution (Berry, 1988: 45; Wilson, 1992). Extinction rates are far greater than at any point in human history, which means we are pulling key pieces
from nature’s design for a healthy complex adaptive
system. (Meadows, Randers, Meadows, 2004: 8586). Edward O. Wilson estimates 27,000 species are
lost per year, and by 2022 an amazing 22 percent of
all species will be extinct if we do not change course
(1992). The Living Planet Index, which tracks population trends for over 1,100 species, finds that biodiversity has declined by 40 percent between 1970
and 2000 (Assadourian, 2006: 92). Each forest cutdown, each mega-damn constructed, each car that
pollutes adds to the destruction of diversity. The
earth has 24 major ecosystem “services” that sustain
life. Scientists estimate 15 of them are degraded or
have already tipped past sustainable limits. This destruction is a defining feature of catastrophic col-

lapse, and it generates the positive feed back loops
that prevent soft landings and post-collapse survival.
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).
Similar to knowledge about climate change, we
are starting to understand how adaptive responses to
problems in one part of the global system can cause
unanticipated, negative reactions in other parts of
the system (Homer-Dixon 2000). The World Bank,
for example, promotes shrimp farming throughout
Latin America’s Pacific coast in order to diversify
economies. The farms, however, destroy coastal
ecologies that ripple through interior ecological systems (Public Citizen, 2005 and Chafe, 2006: 100101). Such destruction makes poverty worse, and
can stimulate forces like migration and urbanization,
causing problems in other parts of the system (Rich,
1994). Resource extraction, especially to meet high
consumer demand in the first world, harms important
ecological regions such as the Amazon and Indonesian forests. The “sinks” necessary for ecological
systems to reproduce are increasingly clogged if not
eliminated (Meadows, Randers, and Meadows, 2004:
51-127).
Some parts of ecology’s complex system are
deadly. An important one is disease. We already see
the reality of catastrophe with the AIDS epidemic in
Africa. Our inability to stop positive feed back loops
that reproduce the epidemic is a grave cause of concern for how we respond to the next great pandemic,
which many think will be the avian flu, a lethal strain
known as H5N1. While a catastrophic outbreak has
not yet happened, public health officials are in
agreement that the question is not if it will happen
but when (Osterholm, 2005 and Greger, 2006). This
warning means that all the systemic factors for a
major pandemic are now in place, with exception of
the virus’s ability to spread from human to human,
which could happen at any unpredictable point in
the future. H5N1 may kill more people than the great
influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919, when upwards of
40 million people died globally. Illustrating the
centrality of complex systems for understanding
pandemics, H5N1 is geographically located in Asia,
and is spreading there because of the region’s dramatic economic boom, which has caused mass movements of people, and stimulated the production of
poultry. As more chickens are produced to feed exploding urban populations – China produces 13 billion chickens today, but only 12.3 million in 1968 - the greater the possibility the virus will jump from
birds to humans (Osterholm, 2005: 37 and Garrett,
2005: 10-11). When that happens, the consequences
for humanity will be catastrophic. Human cases so
far have a 30-70 percent mortality rate (Garrett, 2005:
14). With no immunity humans are vulnerable to a
pandemic that could rapidly kill millions of people.
Maximum global vaccine production is estimated at
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300 million, a fact that raises the disturbing question
of whom among nearly 7 billion people would get
the vaccine, assuming we can develop one that responds to the complexities of H5NI (Garrett, 2005:
17-18). Our experience with SARS, which only lasted 6 months, teaches that the economic costs of a
much larger event could be staggering. SARS cost
the Asian-Pacific region $40 billion (Osterholm,
2005: 28). It is estimated that a H5N1 pandemic
would kill 142.2 million people and cost $4.4 trillion
in lost GDP (Osterholm, 2007: 48). A H5N1 outbreak
would shut down trade, causing a collapse in the
tightly coupled system of “just-in-time,” globalized
production. The influenza would strike labor and
management, causing organizational hierarchies to
falter. As quarantines are established, schools and
factories would close. The health-care system,
already stressed even in the most developed countries, would collapse (Osterholm, 2005 and Greger,
2006).
The fuel, productive, climate, environmental, and
disease challenges facing humanity are compounded
by demographic factors. In a few generations global
population will be 9.5 billion people. The 2 billion
additional people will live in a global South already
struggling to survive. A dramatic jump in the megalopolis phenomena is happening. In 2007, demographers predict the majority of humanity will live in cities, a world historical milestone in the human experience. It is estimated that 70 million people a year
migrate from rural to urban. That’s 1.4 million individuals a week, 200,000 a day, 8,000 an hour, or 130
per minute. At this pace, by 2030 there will be 3
billion urban squatters. If we are to house them, 35
million new houses need to be constructed each year,
about 1 every second (Neuwirth, 2006: xiii). Analysts
like Mike Davis do not hesitate in calling our cities
the dumping grounds for surplus population, as urbanization is defined by the slum phenomena (2006:
174-198). Today’s Mexico Cities are more common,
taxing the limits of weak nation-states to cope.
Global South demographic growth aggravates ecological problems, and accelerates the depletion of
scarce resources. Provisioning clean water and sanitation in the mega-cities already stresses urban systems and their populations (McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2007). Lack of potable water is becoming
more extreme, and some cities, such as El PasoCiudad Juárez are predicted to meet unsustainable
scarcity by 2025 (U.S. Water News Online, 1998).
Suketu Mehta estimates half of Mumbai’s 13 plus
million people do not have toilets or sewage. They
produce 2.5 million kilos of excrement each day. As
it evaporates, suspended fecial dust enters the air and
is breathed by all of Mumbai’s inhabitants (2004).
Lack of basic infrastructure will increase in the 21st
century as more global South cities become megalo-

polises. In China, 114 million people have migrated
to cities; another 250 to 300 million will follow in
the decades ahead (Pei, 2005: 57). In the last eleven
years the number of Chinese cities with 1 or more
million inhabitants has grown to 41. China currently
has 16 of the world’s 20 most populated cities (Lee,
2007: 9). Shanghai, in 2005, built more building
space than exists in all of New York City’s offices,
and every month China adds urban infrastructure
equal to Houston, Texas, the 4th largest city in the
United States (Hughes and Sawin, 2007: 93). Consequent increases in resource consumption and epidemic factors come with such dramatic transitions,
as well as the problem of reproducing complex urban
systems in a stressed world.
Those who are not absorbed by cities continue
their migrations, most often to the global North.
Colin Powell informs that at least 180 million people
do not reside in their countries of birth. The income
they send home, totaling about $93 billion, outpaces
“official” development funds by $16 billion (2005:
32). Such incomes often constitute the second and
third most important items to the gross domestic
product in the global South. Future survival in the
global South will depend more on migration, while
the global North will continue apartheid approaches,
such as those not so subtly advocated by nativists
like Samuel Huntington, to keep migrants out (2004;
2004a). The collision between increasing levels of
migration and deeper host country restrictions means
the current humanitarian crisis facing migrants will
most likely worsen. (Walter, 2006b: 117-139).
Plague and famine, as we know from the human
made tragedy of Africa, are additional components
to the demographics of a complex system in collapse.
Demographic stress manifests itself in genocides and
resource wars. As Michael Klare shows, millions
have perished since the end of World War Two in
vicious civilian conflict (2001). Competition for
scarce, non-renewable resources leads agents of developed world consumers to interact with local dynamics of failed states, ecological stress, and extreme
poverty in causing these deadly wars (Tabb, 2007;
and Ross 2003). Over 5 million people died in these
wars during the 1990s, while 6 million fled to other
countries, and roughly 15 million were internally
displaced. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction makes these conflicts more dangerous and
harder to contain within the geopolitical periphery.
Paul Kennedy clearly illustrates how global hegemons succumb to decline and collapse because of
imperial overreach (1987). History teaches that increased military expenditures required for managing
complex global systems undermine the actual
foundations making the great powers great. History
also teaches that during moments of imperial overreach major shocks to the global system result. Less
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understood is the connection between overreach and
the inability to manage the vexations of systemic
collapse, and there is very little doubt that it’s already
very expensive. The United States has spent nearly
a trillion dollars on military operations since
September 11, 2001, and there is no foreseeable end
to that money drain. Compare these costs of empire
to the $15 billion, five-year program pledged by the
Bush administration to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria, and we begin to see how overreach prevents
us from attacking the real mass killers (Garrett, 2007:
19). With 26 million deaths and 40 million current
afflictions, AIDS has killed far more people than
Saddam Hussein. The 2006 discretionary Department
of Defense budget is a staggering $419.3 billion,
which constitutes nearly half of the entire discretionary budget of $840.3 billion. The military’s budget
is roughly equivalent to the current United States
federal deficit, and represents an unhealthy portion
of its GDP. The cost of empire means less money is
spent on crucial domestic infrastructure, a truth
painfully revealed by Hurricane Katrina and the Interstate 35 bridge collapse in Minneapolis. Such investments are necessary for competing in the globalized economy, especially with countries and regions
that are not making comparable military expenditures.
Transitions in the global system’s hegemonic
power are moments of great instability and danger
(Mahbubani, 2005: 50). The last transition from
Great Britain to the United States came with two
global wars that killed millions of people. As the
center of the global capitalist system increasingly
moves away from the United States, uncertainty and
stress in the complex system of international finance,
trade, production, and wealth increase. Reasonable
people think Asia is becoming the next geographic
center of global capitalism. Jeffrey Sachs, for example, estimates that by 2050, China’s economy
might be 75 percent bigger than the US economy
(Fishman, 2006: 17). By 2003, $450 billion of foreign money entered the Chinese economy. Much of
it flows from the United States as we consume vast
quantities of Chinese production. China, in 2004,
had a $480 billion stake in US securities markets
(Fishman, 2006: 265). China is the second largest
importer of oil, constituting 31 percent of the world’s
oil demand growth. Its 9 percent economic growth
rate equates to a need for 1 million barrels of oil
every day (Fishman, 2006: 117). This oil demand
finds China aggressively forming close partnerships
with oil producers in the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America, often with enemies of the United
States. China negotiates trade and energy deals
throughout the world, quietly positioning itself as a
global economic power. Quality statesmanship is
required to navigate the potential for serious military

conflict in the years ahead, especially as the United
States and China compete for scarce resources, investment opportunities, and markets (Jianhai and
Zweig, 2005).
The current sub-prime interest rate global financial
crisis demonstrates several key points about the
structural vulnerability of the global economy. First,
keeping the global system in growth phase is accruing huge costs to the system. The economy is in
overshoot, and we are extending more and more inputs to keep it alive. We are in a classic positive
feedback loop, one defined by the “growth imperative” generating steeply negative returns that push
the system deeper into collapse. The costs for reproducing the global economy are so immense they
make the system unsustainable. The United States
currently serves as the consumer of last resort, a role
that sustains global economic growth, especially in
China and India. This system rests upon an unending
capacity of the US consumer to increase debt, an
unsustainable proposition. Average credit card debt
balance per cardholder is $4,956 at end of 2005, and
unpaid credit card balances at end of 2005 reached
$838 billion (Foster, 2006). Other significant ticking
time bombs lurk within the system. The aging population in the global North combined with its population decline means a major crisis in retirement is
right around the corner (Barnett, 2004: 206-214; and
Ghilarducci, 2006). Matching the pension problem
is the growing crisis in heath care and insurance in
the global North.
These structural problems can merge with larger
systemic problems in overwhelming the economy.
The end of oil’s transformation in energy, production,
and food systems carries heavy price tag. Even if the
global North can afford the transition, billions upon
billions live in areas of the world that have no ability
to pay for the new technologies, production, and
distribution systems. Increased natural disasters are
taxing the system’s ability to pay for them. Caring
for vulnerable populations might be well beyond the
capacity of humanity to fund. The cost of war keeps
increasing, and pulls crucial funds from other systemic needs, such as the transition away from oil and
contending with natural disasters. There is a wide
range of costs not calculated in how capitalism balances its accounts, especially when measured by
GDP. These costs include: ecological destruction,
poor health conditions, resource depletion, and pollution. High levels of systemic stress combined with
high costs, especially in a tightly coupled globalized
economy, mean the system’s resilience is compromised.
When confronted with the “Perfect Storm,” optimists may think that we need to focus on changing
course. This view, however, is part of the problem.
We have long ago passed the time when we could
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have changed course. Our complex system carries
immense momentum generated by the positive
feedback loops driving it (Meadows, Randers,
Meadows, 2004: 141-145). We are a freight train
attempting to stop quickly when its speed and weight
will carry it into doom. It is foolish to only speak of
alternatives. Instead, what we need is sober and
sophisticated discussion about preparing as best we
can for catastrophic collapse.
A core problem exists in our ability to understand
the meaning of the “Perfect Storm” for the human
experience. The systems we have designed are so
complex we have trouble understanding how they
work in totality. As Homer-Dixon explains in Ingenuity Gap, we are good at seeing the parts of the system, but falter with the bigger picture (2000: 171187). In part, this problem reflects the consequence
of fragmentation of knowledge within academia, as
well as the specialization needs of capitalist society.
Consequently, we conflate symptoms for causes, and
tend to see problems as isolated, unfortunate occurrences within an otherwise healthy system. Few
people frame discussion of Hurricane Katrina, the
Tsunami, the Iraq War, China’s emergence, AIDS,
mass migration, genocides, or September 11th as interrelated outputs of a complex system that is in the
process of collapse. Until the bigger picture starts to
shape our discussions, we will have immense
troubles surviving the “Perfect Storm.”
More troublesome, the failure to frame the bigger
picture distorts our ability to devise public policy
that can reduce the impact of the “Perfect Storm.”
Very powerful analytical tools, such as data mining,
can do wonders in navigating catastrophe, but they
are only as good as the information we put in, and
that information is flawed if we fail to understand
what the complex system is doing. Likewise, misuse
of tools from the social and hard sciences can exacer-

bate an immense problem already generated by the
early salvos of the “Perfect Storm,” that being global
apartheid.
As the complex system continues to become unglued, the historical distinctions between rich and
poor, racial minority and majority, men and women,
the global North and South will intensify. Social and
economic injustice will define how we respond to
particular crises and the overall condition of humanity during collapse. We will have to decide among
the 7 to 9 billion people who gets medicine, water,
heat, shelter, and food. We will decide who lives and
who must die. As environmental justice scholars
demonstrate, we already make these decisions, and
the results are brutal for much of humanity (Agyeman, 2005). An estimated 2.7 billion people survive
on $2 a day, while 1 billion children face severe nutritional deprivation (Homer-Dixon, 2006: 186-187).
Yet, we pretend these decisions are not made, and
we ignore the brutal mechanisms of repression and
exclusion required to enforce these decisions. As
catastrophic collapse deepens, our global apartheid
will become more severe. The walls we have already
built and militarized in places like Palestine and the
United States and Mexican border will become ever
more present. Sophisticated technologies will be
horded by the haves and deprived for the have-nots.
Ever increasing segments of the global population
will be excluded from health care, food, water,
shelter, and work. Exactly what this reality will mean
to the human condition is hard for us to imagine. It
means the Enlightenment’s faith in the perfectibility
of the human condition will give way to a new vision
for humans, one rooted in the basic need to survive
as a species. The conservative view of the state of
nature is well positioned to further manipulate our
darker angels.
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